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MEMBER OF COMMUNIST PARTY DENIED
PRIVILEGE OF NATURALIZATION
Petitioner, an admitted member of the Communist Party
of the United States, sought to become naturalized. Although
not a conscientious objector, he testified that he would sup-
port this country with arms only if attacked, and he refused
to state unqualifiedly that he would bear arms for the United
States in case of war with a Communist power. Held, petition
denied: §§305 and 307 of the Nationality Act of 1940' in ef-
fect deny naturalization to Communist Party members; and
petitioner's refusal to say he would support this country in
event of war further showed that he was not attached to the
principles of the Constitution within the meaning of §307.
In re Mackay, 71 F.Supp. 397 (N.D. Ind. 1947).
Section 305 of Nationality Act of 1940
Section 305 does not specifically name any group as
being ineligible for citizenship; it does provide that members
of any organization which advocates the overthrow of the
Government by force and violence shall not be naturalized.2
The instant case is the first to interpret the above provisions
of the Act. It was thus necessary to determine whether the
Act denies to members of the Communist Party the privilege
of naturalization3
The purpose of the Nationality Act of 1940 was to revise
and codify the law relating to immigration and naturalization.
Section 305 of the bill as originally written was a restatement
of the prior naturalization statute which did not include Com-
munists within its scope.4 However, that fact was noted by
1. 54 Stat. 1137, 1141, 1142; 8 U.S.C. §§705, 707 (1940).
2. The pertinent provisions of §305 are: "No person shall hereafter
be naturalized as a citizen . . . who . . is a member of any
• . . organization . . . that believes in, advises, advocates, or
teaches-(1) the overthrow by force or violence of the Government
of the United States."
3. "The opportunity to become a citizen of the United States is said
to be merely a privilege and not a right. It is true that the Con-
stitution does not confer upon aliens the right to naturalization.
But it authorizes Congress to establish a uniform rule therefor.Article 1, §8, cl.4. The opportunity having been conferred by the
Naturalization Act, there is a statutory right in the alien to submit
his petition and evidence to a court, to have that tribunal pass
upon them, and, if the requisite facts are established, to receive
the certificate." Tutun v. U.S., 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1926).
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the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the
House of Representatives and §305 was returned to a sub-
committee to be amended to include Communists. In the
opinion of the Committee as expressed both within the Com-
mittee and before the House of Representatives §305, as
amended and adopted, denies naturalization to Communists.,
Perhaps the greatest objection which could be made to placing
that construction upon §305 is that the Communist Party
might advocate a change in the form of Government by peace-
ful means rather than by the use of force and violence. Signi-
ficantly, that objection was expressly rejected by the Com-
mittee with regard to the Communist Party.
7
The legislative history of §305 thus shows that the
section was drafted for the express purpose of denying natu-
ralization to Communists and that this purpose of the section
was related to the House of Representatives prior to its pas-
sage. The decision that petitioner, as a member of the Com-
munist Party, is denied the privilege of naturalization by
§305 of the Nationality Act of 1940 is therefore supported
by the legislative history of that Act,8 which is indicative of
the Congressional intent.9
4. Hearings before Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on
H.R. 6127, superseded by H.R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1940). The prior Act forbade naturalization to disbelievers in
organized government, polygamists, and advocates of political
assassination. 34 Stat. 596, 598-599 (1906).
5. The Chairman: " . . . Without objection the amendment will
include Communists and also Fascists and Nazis and any others
who advocate attempting to overthrow the government." Hearings
before Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 6127,
superseded by H.R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1940).
For further references to the intent of the Committee to deny
the privilege of naturalization to Communists, see id. at 4, 68, 210,
304, 327-331, 336, 375, 394, 436, 525.
6. Before the Committee it was stated that §305 is "so comprehen-
sive that it will include anarchists or Communists, Fascists, Nazis,
and every other one." Id. at 328.
The following discussion took place before the House of Rep-
resentatives:
Mr. REES of Kansas: " . . . Under this bill, we believe we have
covered the question of fascism, nazi-ism, communism, or any other
'ism', although they are not specifically mentioned by name . . . "
Mr. NORRELL: "In other words, if he is that kind of person to
begin with, he cannot become naturalized?"
Mr. REES: "The gentleman is right." 86 Cong. Rec. 11949 (1940).
7. Hearings before Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on
H.R. 6127 superseded by H.R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 327-328
(1940).
8. Instant case at 399.
9. U.S. v. Great Northern Ry. 287 U.S. 144, 154 (1932).
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While the "force and violence" provisions of §305 are
without prior judicial interpretation, similar provisions in
other statutes have frequently been before the courts.10 Two
methods have been used to apply such statutes to members of
the Communist Party. One of these methods is the inter-
pretation of Communist literature to determine that the Party
advocates the use of force and violence to overthrow the
Government.1 The basic weakness of that approach is that
it involves the interpretation of Communist publications with-
out reference to the period or circumstances in which they
were written or the immediate purpose of the publication. 12
10. Alien Registration Act of 1940. 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940). 18 U.S.C.§10(a) (3) (Supp. 1947) prohibits the organization of and mem-
bership in an organization which advocates the overthrow of gov-
ernment by force and violence; however, the Act has never been
applied to Communists. For an application of the Act see Dunne
v. U.S., 138 F.2d 137 (C.C.A. 8th 1943).
The Hatch Political Activity Act, 53 Stat. 1147, 1148 (1939),
18 U.S.C. §611 (Supp. 1-947) makes it unlawful for a federal em-
ployee to be a member of an organization which advocates the over-
throw of our constitutional form of government. See U.S. v. Mar-
zani, 71 F.Supp. 615 (D.C.D.C. 1947) for an application of the Act
to a Communist.
41 Stat. 1008, 1009 (1920), 8 U.S.C. §137(c) (1940) provides
that alien members of such organizations shall be excluded from
admission into the United States or having entered shall be de-
ported. See cases cited notes 11, 13, and 19, infra.
See also the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 §9(h),
61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §159(h) (Supp. 1947) which pro-
vides that affidavits by officers of labor organizations to the ef-
fect that they are not Communists and do not advocate the over-
throw of the government by force and violence shall be a pre-
requisite to enforcing certain provisions of the Act. For a dis-
cussion of the pertinent provisions of the Act see Reilly, "The
Taft-Hartley Act," 20 Tenn. L. Rev. 181 (1948).
11. Instant case at 398-399. In Abern v. Wallis, 268 Fed. 413(S.D.N.Y. 1920) the court held: " . . . the manifesto and pro-
gramme of the Communist Party, together with other exhibits in
the case, are of such character as to easily lead a reasonable man
to conclude that the purpose of the Communist Party is to ac-
complish its end, namely, the capture and destruction of the state,
as now constituted, by force and violence." Accord, first circuit:
Skeffington v. Katseff, 277 Fed. 129 (C.C.A. 1st 1922); second
circuit: Vojewvic v. Curran, 11 F.2d 683 (C.C.A. 2d 1926);
seventh circuit: Kjar v. Doak, 61 F.2d 566 (C.C.A. 7th 1932);
ninth circuit: Branch v. Cahill, 88 F.2d 545 (C.C.A. 9th 1937)
Sormenen v. Nagle, 59 F.2d 398 (C.C.A. 9th 1932); Ex parte
Vilarino, 50 F.2d 582 (C.C.A. 9th 1931); Kenmotsu v. Nagle, 44
F.2d 953 (C.C.A. 9th 1930). Cf. cases cited n.15, infra. But cf.
Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F.2d 976 (C.C.A. 5th 1938).
12. The publication most frequently interpreted to determine that the
Communist Party advocates the use of force and violence is Marx,
"Manifesto of the Communist Party" (1848).
In Scbneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 154 (1942), a de-
naturalization proceeding, the Supreme Court considered the Com-
munist Manifesto and other literature and, while an interpretation
19481
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Another possible approach to the "force and violence"
provisions of the Act is to take judicial notice that the Com-
munist Party advocates the use of force and violence to over-
throw the government.1  Courts may take judicial notice of
matters which are so notorious as not to be disputed or which
are capable of immediate and accurate demonstration. 14
Therefore, it becomes necessary to inquire whether judicial
notice of Communist Party principles can be justified as being
within either of the above categories. While the fact that the
Party advocates the use of force and violence has been refer-
red to in language which indicates notoriety, the courts have
not held that the Party so advocates without relying, at least
in part, on an interpretation of Party literature. 5 The cases
which have interpreted Communist literature and held that
the Party advocates the use of force would indicate that the
matter is capable of immediate proof ;16 however, those cases
have not been uniformly followedY.1 Therefore, it would seem
that the force and violence issue with regard to the Commun-
ist Party is not within the proper scope of judicial notice. 8
Section 307 of Nationality Act of 1940
Section 307 does not refer to members of any organiz-
ation but only denies naturalization to individuals who are
not "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States and well disposed to the good order and happi-
of this material was unnecessary to the decision in that case, the
Court indicated that it would difficult to esablish the principles
of a political party by merely reading the publications of the party
without reference to the circumstances in which they were written.
13. " . . . the Court may take judicial knowledge of the historical
fact that Communism . . . advocates force and a so-called dic-
tatorship of the proletariat as a necessary means of obtaining the
objectives of Communism;" Instant case at 399.
14. 9 Wig-more, "Evidence" §2571 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, "Judicial
Notice", 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 286 (1944).
15. The fact that the Communist Party advocates the use of force
and violence has been referred to in the following language:
"well known" Yokinen v. Comm'r of Immigration, 57 F.2d 707(C.C.A. 2d 1932); "general knowledge" Murdoch v. Clark, 53 F.2d
155, 157 (C.C.A. 1st 1931); and "settled" Ex parte Jurgans, 17
F.2d 507, 511 (D.Minn. 1927). The decisions in the above cases
also rely on an interpretation of Communist literature either by
the court or in prior cases. By one theory of judicial notice it is
iimproper for a court to hear evidence on a matter of which it has
taken judicial notice. Morgan, supra n.14.
16. Cases cited n.11 supra.
17. See n.27 infra.
18. Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942);
State v. Reeves, 5 Wash.2d 637, 106 P.2d 729 (1940).
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ness of the United States. . . . " The instant case raised
the question of whether a member of the Communist Party
can be attached to the principles of the Constitution. 9
Assuming that the principles of the Communist Party
are incompatible with the Constitution, would it necessarily
follow that a Party member cannot be attached to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution? A holding to that effect is in fact
an imputation to the party member of the party principles.20
The imputation is difficult to justify in the absence of a
showing that petitioner has adopted the principles of the Com-
munist Party as his own principles.2 1 If members of political
parties are to be barred from citizenship upon that basis
alone, the determination as to which political parties are to
be thus affected is properly a legislative function. Section
305 has the effect of imputing the principles of the Commu-
nist Party to a member thereof by providing that membership
alone is a bar to naturalization. Therefore, the attempt of
the Court in the instant case to apply the same reasoning to
§307 was unnecessary.22
19. Instant case at 399.
20. Petitions for naturalization have been denied to members of or-
ganizations as such: In re Skoglund, 46 F.Supp. 434 (D.Minn.
1942) (member of Socialist Party, Communist Party, Communist
League of America, and Workers' Party of America in succession);
In re Olson, 4 F.2d 417 (W.D.Wash. 1925) (member of I.W.W.);
certificates of naturalization of party members have been can-
celed: U.S. v. Topolcsanyi, 40 F.2d 255 (C.C.A. 3d 1930) (Com-
munist); and party members have been deported: Lisafeld v.
Smith, 2 F.2d 90 (W.D.N.Y. 1924).
21. It is now settled that the government in a denaturalization pro-
ceeding must show lack of attachment by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence." A mere showing of membership in the Com-
munist Party does not meet this requirement. Schneiderman v.
U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 158-159 (1942). The rule in a naturalization
proceeding has been declared to be that when doubts exist con-
cerning the grant of citizenship, "generally at least, they should
be resolved in favor of the United States and against the claim-
ant." U.S. v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 (1928). Even the latter
more liberal rule does not appear to justify the strict imputation of
party principles to a party member. For an interesting application
of the Schneiderman decision see U.S. v. Korner, 56 F.Supp. 242(S.D. Calif. 1944), a denaturalization proceeding, where the court
held that the government must prove lack of attachment by facts
which show a "clear and present danger" in the defendant's
conduct.
22. For a thorough discussion of the attempt to regulate the Com-
munist Party by legislative means see Hearings before Subcom-
mittee on Legislation of the Committee on Un-American Activities
on H.R. 4422 and H.R. 4581, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); the fol-
lowing pages are particularly in point with the problem involved
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A further question raised under § 307 by the instant
case was whether the refusal of one who was not a consci-
entious objector to take an oath to bear arms in the event of
future wars showed a lack of attachment to the principles of
the Constitution.23 Congress has seen fit to exempt con-
scientious objectors from their Constitutional duty to bear
arms,24 and the Supreme Court has given effect to this policy
by admitting to citizenship persons who as conscientious ob-
jectors refused to take the oath to bear arms.2 5  However,
the Congressional exemption from the duty to bear arms has
been limited to those persons whose objections stem from re-
ligious training and belief. 26 If the courts are to give effect
to this Congressional policy, exemption from taking the oath
to bear arms should be similarly limited. Therefore, a peti-
tioner for naturalization who for policital reasons refuses to
take the oath to bear arms is properly denied citizenship as
a person who is not attached to the principles of the Con-
stitution.
The strongest ground for the decision in the instant case
is the legislative history of §305 of the Nationality Act of
1940. It is unfortunate that more weight was not given to
that ground in the opinion. In so far as the decision rests
in the instant case: 130-145, 434-445, 456-457, 458-469, 470-490,
492-493, 493-495.
See Biddle, "The Nurnberg Trial", 33 Va. L. Rev. 679, 691-
693 (1947) for a discussion of criminality of membership in an or-
ganization in relation to the War Crimes Trials.
23. Instant case at 400.
24. The Selective Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 889 (1940); 50
U.S.C.App. §305(g) (1940) provides: " . . . Nothing contained
in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject
to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of
the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief,
is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form . . . " Other statutes providing such exemptions were:
40 Stat. 557, 558 (1918) ; 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917) ; 39 Stat. 116, 197(1916) ; 32 Stat. 775 (1903); 13 Stat. 6, 9 (1864).
25. Girouard v. U.S., 328 U.S. 61 (1945) (Seventh Day Adventist).
Prior to the Girouard case the refusal to take an oath to bear arms
for any reason was a ground for denying citizenship; the follow-
ing cases which denied citizenship upon that ground were expressly
overruled by the Girouard case: U.S. v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931)
(Nurse with religious scruples against bearing arms); U.S. v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (Baptist minister, member of facul-
ty of Divinity School, Chaplain of Yale Graduate School, and
Dwight Professor of Theology); U.S. v. Schwiminmer, 279 U.S. 644
(1929) (Uncompromising pacifist).
26. Berman v. U.S., 156 F.2d 377, 382 (C.C.A. 9th 1946); U.S. v.
Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 707 (C.C.A. 2d 1943) interpreting the Select-
ive Service Act of 1940, n.23, supra.
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upon the interpretation of Communist literature, judicial
notice of Communist Party principles, or the imputation of
Communist Party principles to a party member, it is of
doubtful validity. While prior decisions support these
grounds, the more recent and better reasoned cases reject
them.27 Finally the holding that the refusal to take an oath
to bear arms is a ground for denying citizenship to one who
is not a conscientious objector is in accord with the Congres-
sional policy of exempting conscientious objectors from the
duty of bearing arms and does not conflict with the policy
of admitting such conscientious objectors to citizenship with-
out the oath to bear arms.
TORTS
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY IN HIRING PHYSICALLY
UNFIT EMPLOYEE
An employee sued his employer in tort1 for personal
injuries caused when the employee's serious heart disease
was aggravated by hard manual labor. The complaint alleged
that the employer required a physical examination at the time
of hiring, which disclosed the heart ailment; but that the
employee was unaware of the disease and the employer did
not inform him of it although the employer knew that strenu-
ous labor would be likely to cause harm. It was further al-
leged that the employer had breached two duties: that of re-
fraining from assigning the employee hard manual labor,
and that of informing him of his infirmity. The trial court
gave judgment for the employee. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Maine reversed, holding the complaint defective in
27. Recent cases rejecting these grounds are: Schneiderman v. U.S.,
320 U.S. 118 (1942); Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F.2d 976 (C.C.A. 5th
1938); Ex parte Fierstein, 41 F.2d 53 (C.C.A. 9th 1930); Com-
munist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942); State
v. Reeves, 5 Wash. 2d 637, 106 P.2d 729 (1940).
1. The employee in the principal case did not bring his action under
the Maine Workmen's Compensation Act because that Act provides
for recovery against employers only when the injury was caused
by an "accident." Ale. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 26, §8. Here the heart
injury resulted gradually from the work and did not result directly
from a sudden strain. Cf. Coiner's Case, 130 Me. 373, 156 Atl.
516 (1931), where a pre-existing heart ailment, aggravated by a
sudden strain, was held to be "accidental" within the meaning of
the Maine statute. See also Brown's Case, 123 Me. 424, 1L23 AtI.
421 (1924): "Sudden heart dilatation caused by a strain would be
we think in ordinary parlance called accidental."
